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I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the advent of new threats to national and human security,
Viet Dinh's article, Nationalism in the Age of Terror' makes a case for the
continued relevance of state sovereignty and patriotism in the twenty-first
century. Counter to the recent tendency in some quarters to denounce state
sovereignty as an obstacle to international legality, and patriotism as an
impediment to universal justice, Professor Dinh reasserts the analytical and
normative value of both of these concepts. He is, I believe, quite correct to
do so.
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Law, Wayne State University. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1987; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1992; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley,
1996.
1. Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867 (2004).
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Relevant though they are to many questions, however, sovereignty and
patriotism are inherently complex and ambiguous concepts, and their
invocation alone has little determinate consequence for legal and political
judgments. Professor Dinh's article speaks only in relatively general terms,
both about these concepts and about his view of their application to post-
September 11,2001 global realities. It is, clearly, the start of a much more
elaborate conversation.
This Commentary follows up on Professor Dinh's article by further
exploring the fundamental concepts that he invokes, in an effort to draw
out more precisely what is at stake in assessments of their continued
relevance. The discussion below rejects the commonplace framing of the
issue as "state sovereignty versus international law, ' '2 and instead draws on
the existing legal prerogatives of states to articulate a unifying account of
sovereignty's role within the international legal order. That account makes
a case for the moral, as well as the practical, significance of sovereignty,
with further implications for how patriotic duties relate to the demands of
universalist morality.
On the account rendered below, the foundations of the international
legal system reflect persistent, though bounded, disagreement within its
membership as to what constitutes a just internal public order. While the
boundaries of the system's pluralism have narrowed progressively in the
course of the United Nations era, accommodation of diversity in modes of
internal political organization remains a durable theme of the international
order. This accommodation of diversity underlies the international
system's commitment to preserve states' territorial integrity and political
independence, often at the expense of other values. Sovereignty, thus
operates as a set of legal limitations on the establishment and enforcement
of international norms. Though frequently counterintuitive, these legal
limitations are supported by substantial moral and political considerations,
and they should be overridden only in a limited range of cases.
II. THE MANY MEANINGS OF SOVEREIGNTY
A. Different Conversations
Since the end of the Cold War era, there has been a proliferation of
scholarly works devoted to state sovereignty. Most of these either
approvingly announce the phenomenon's decline, demise, or
transformation,3 or else call into question whether the phenomenon ever
2. See Henry Schermers, Different Aspects of Sovereignty, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 185, 192 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) ("[U]nder international
law the sovereignty of States must be reduced.").
3. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
[Vol. 56
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existed or mattered in the first place A countervailing (though much
smaller) set of works, presenting the diminution of sovereignty as a threat
to important values, proposes policies aimed at bolstering or restoring the
phenomenon.'
Although this literature appears on its face to address sovereignty as a
unitary topic, it encompasses widely variant understandings of the core
concept. Often, these variant understandings bear on wholly separate areas
of inquiry.
Any definition of sovereignty presupposes a set of practical questions
to which the concept is thought to pertain. In general, the term "sovereign"
denotes a source of ultimate authority, as opposed to authority that is
shared with another institution or subordinated to systemic norms and
enforcement mechanisms. But as applied, sovereignty may refer to a range
of distinct phenomena, including, inter alia: (1) the source, within a given
domestic system of governmental norms, of the last word on public order
(and above all, on what counts as the legitimate use of force) in a, state's
territory;7 (2) the normative attributes of full membership in an
international system premised on the "sovereign equality" of states;' (3) a
state's empirical capacity, as measured by the tools of social science, to
control its internal affairs, or to determine its own internal or external
policies without regard to the preferences of external actors;9 or (4) a
domestic policymaking imperative to maintain or establish a state's
COMPLIANCE wrI INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) (arguing for a
reconceptualization of sovereignty as, not freedom to act independently, but standing to participate
in international regulatory regimes); FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 32-33 (1996) (arguing that sovereign prerogative can no longer
validly be asserted by states delinquent in their fundamental responsibilities to their citizens); Helen
Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2045 (2003) (calling for sovereignty to be
redefined in terms of "care by government for its citizens" and responsible regulation of "citizens'
interactions with the international community").
4. See, e.g., STEPHEND. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 40(1999) (noting
that as a result of "the absence of authoritative institutions and power asymmetries," principles
associated with sovereignty are often not reflected in practice); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and
State "Sovereignty, " 25 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 31, 31 (1995/1996) (asserting that "'sovereignty'
is a mistake, indeed a mistake built upon mistakes, which has barnacled an unfortunate
mythology").
5. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998) (arguing that the United
States has allowed too much national policy to be decided through international channels and
proposing a reassertion of American sovereignty).
6. See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782, 786 (2003).
7. See CARL SCHMrrr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5-15 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985).
8. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1.
9. See CHRISTIAN REus-SMiT, THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE STATE 157 (1999).
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unilateral control over any given realm of activity.' All of these usages
pertain to different conversations, and any conflation of them will
immediately lead to confusion.
This Commentary is concerned exclusively with the first two usages.
These specify juridical relationships foundational to domestic orders and
to the international order, respectively."
B. Sovereignty and Domestic Legality
The domestic-juridical sense of "sovereignty" evokes an anti-
constitutionalist doctrine, originating in the works of Jean Bodin and
Thomas Hobbes, that identifies an uncommanded commander, above the
law, as the ultimate source of domestic authority. 2 According to Hobbes,
"[T]he sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not
subject to the civil laws."' 3 He further explained:
10. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 782-89. Further:
[W]hen someone argues that the United States should not accept a treaty because
that treaty infringes upon U.S. sovereignty, what the person most often means is
that he or she believes a certain set of decisions should be made, as a matter of
good governmental policy, at the nation-state (U.S.) level, and not at the
international level.
Id. at 790.
11. Juridical doctrines are distinct from both empirical observations and policy
considerations. To be sure, law would not long endure if it were utterly disconnected from empirical
realities; but rather than automatically capitulating to whatever acts are efficacious in the short run,
law imposes standards on the basis of which such acts can be evaluated, and perhaps resisted. These
standards, in turn, embody, and therefore must be interpreted in light of, policies. But legal
standards reflect long-term policies, imputable to the domestic or international community as a
whole, rather than a particular efficacious actor's policies of the moment.
12. See JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M. J. Tooley trans., Basil
Blackwell 1955) (1576) (characterizing the sovereign as the ruler with an unqualified and absolute
right to command); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND II (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651)
(characterizing the sovereign as the sole lawmaker, not subject to civil law).
13. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 211. Hobbes continued:
For having power to make and repeal laws, he may when he pleases free himself
from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him and making of new;
and consequently he was free before. For he is free that can be free when he will;
nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he that can bind
can release, and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound.
Id.; see also 2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LmRI TRES 102 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
Clarendon Press 1925) (1625) ("That power is called sovereign whose actions are not subject to the
legal control of another, so that they cannot be rendered void by the operation of another human
will.").
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It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature,
because such laws be divine and cannot by any man or
commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the
sovereign himself-that is, which the commonwealth-makes
he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to
the commonwealth-that is, to the sovereign
representative-that is, to himself, which is not subjection but
freedom from the laws. Which error, because it sets the laws
above the sovereign, sets also a judge above him and a power
to punish him, which is to make a new sovereign, and again
for the same reason a third to punish the second, and so
continually without end to the confusion and dissolution of
the commonwealth. 4
This approach regards all separation of powers as anathema, "[f]or what is
it to divide the power of a commonwealth but to dissolve it, for powers
divided mutually destroy each other."' 5
As originally advocated, the uncommanded-commander doctrine
scarcely has any remaining defenders. The alternative doctrine-the
outlines of which can be seen as early as the sixteenth century in the
writings of Bodin's ideological opponent, Frangois Hotman' 6-regards
sovereignty as constituted by legal norms, whether embodied in communal
traditions or in a foundational document. 7 In this constitutive account
(which need not entail liberal or democratic principles), sovereignty
belongs to the political community as a whole. One identifies authentic
articulations of sovereign will by reference to a legal framework that the
community's efficacious actors widely acknowledge as the touchstone of
legitimacy. That framework confers authority on the dictates of specified
persons at specified times within specified ranges of competence;'" being
the source of governmental authority, it also serves as a limitation on the
14. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 254-55.
15. Id. at 255. Hobbes ridiculed the idea of divided powers as "beholding to some of those
that, making profession of the laws, endeavor to make them depend upon their own learning and
not upon the legislative power." Id.
16. Franqois Hotman, Francogallia, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RESISTANCE IN
THE SDcrEENTH CENTURY 53, app. at 90-91 (Julian H. Franklin & ed. trans., 1969) (stating that
French kings historically had been, and therefore by custom were, "bound by definite laws and
compacts").
17. See id.
18. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593,603 (1958) ("[N]othing which legislators do makes law unless they comply with fundamental
accepted rules specifying the essential'lawmaking procedures.").
1021
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
legitimate exercise of power. Even a quasi-absolute dynastic monarch
cannot stand above the customary law on which his rule is founded. 9
In ordinary times, this latter account of governmental authority
dominates the jurisprudential discourse. Nonetheless, perceptions of a
grave threat to public order raise questions about ultimate authority that a
constitutionalist approach may not satisfactorily resolve. The Constitution,
it is often said, is not a "suicide pact";2  rather, it acknowledges, either
explicitly or implicitly, a residuum of discretionary authority, inherent in
sovereignty, to suspend constitutional norms in the face of existential
threats to the constitutional order itself." On this theory, even where the
Constitution authentically reflects the political community's will, its static
interpretation of that will cannot be a complete guide to action in
subsequently arising exigent circumstances, the details of which can never
be fully foreseen. As further developed in the Weimar-era work of Carl
Schmitt, the insights of Bodin and Hobbes, obscured in normal times,
become salient at the moment of "the exception."22
Since September 11, 2001, echoes of Schmitt can be heard in
arguments for an expanded interpretation of emergency powers. Though
predicated on highly questionable assessments of the nature and extent of
the current crisis, these arguments do not lack a sound conceptual basis.
Schmitt's analysis of the relationship between sovereignty and
constitutionalism, however prone to abuse in its application, remains
jurisprudentially formidable.
19. As Carl Schmitt trenchantly observed, modem constitutionalism conceptualizes the state
as "nothing else than the legal order itself.... The highest competence cannot be traceable to a
person or to a sociopsychological power complex but only to the sovereign order in the unity of the
system of norms." ScHMrrr, supra note 7, at 19.
20. This phrase, though surely not all of the uses to which it has been put, can be traced to
Justice Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
21. "[Tlhe authority to suspend valid law-be it in general or in a specific case-is... the
actual mark of sovereignty." ScHmrrr, supra note 7, at 9.
22. SCHMrr, supra note 7, at 5. Schmitt's ultimate point is that sovereignty can never be
fully subsumed within a constitutional order. See GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE
EXCEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND
1936, at 30-37, 44-49 (2d ed. Greenwood Press 1989). Enemies of the Constitution can, after all,
justify its overthrow in the name of a latent pouvoir constituant, and their claim will be deemed
vindicated if their revolution is efficacious. See id. So, too, argues Schmitt, can allies of the
Constitution, in the name of their own interpretation of the political community's latent will (as
embodied in the constitutional order as a whole), suspend temporarily those aspects of the
constitutional order that impede the fight for its very survival. See id.
[Vol. 56
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C. Sovereignty and International Legality
The international-juridical sense of "sovereignty" does not depend on
the resolution of such controversies about extra-constitutional authority,
for it reflects a horizontal rather than a vertical relationship. It refers to the
reciprocal terms of the recognition that members of an international legal
order confer on one another. Among the term's primary implications is a
presumptive duty, on the part of each of the entities bearing equal juridical
status, to respect the outcome of political processes internal to the others.
For the purposes of international law, sovereignty belongs not to any
governmental apparatus, but to "the state" in the abstract. Sovereignty is
a legal attribute of a territorially bounded political community enjoying full
membership in the international system. Recognized exercises of
sovereignty are acts legally attributed to the will of the designated
territory's permanent population as a whole. Statehood is conceptualized
as consummating the self-determination of a "people."23 Competing
governmental apparatuses may at a given moment hold significant shares
23. "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. I,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 3 [hereinafter
ICESCRI; see also G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) (identifying self-determination with a"right to complete independence"); G.A. Res.
1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Annex (1960) (setting forth
the criteria for territorial political communities to which the right applies). The United Nations
General Assembly's authoritative interpretation of the United Nations Charter affirms as an
imperative "the territorial integrity [and] political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples.., and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." Declaration on Principles ofinternational
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, U.N.
Doc. A/8082/Annex (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
Thus, the system predicates its acknowledgment and protection of state sovereignty on the
latter's presumptive fulfillment of the self-determination of "the whole people belonging to the
territory." Id. Conversely, "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation.., is contrary to the Charter." Id. Accordingly, the General Assembly has affirmed that
nonintervention norms shall not "prejudice in any manner the right to self-determination, freedom
and independence of peoples under colonial domination, foreign occupation or racist regimes."
Declaration on the Inadmissibility ofIntervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs ofStates,
G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/5 I/Annex (1981). The
rights of "peoples," however, should in no way be confused with the rights of "persons belonging
to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities" within recognized territorial boundaries.
See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, U.N. Doc.
A/47/49 (1992) (making no reference to self-determination).
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of effective control or popular adherence within the designated territory
without affecting the state's juridical unity.
No particular ruler or constitutionally designated body has a guarantee
of standing to assert rights, incur obligations, and confer immunities in the
name of the underlying sovereign entity. In principle, a sovereign political
community has the inalienable right to overthrow its political and legal
systems for any reason whatsoever.24 Although recent denials of
international recognition to the outcomes of coups d'6tat against elected
governments might seem to call into question the inalienability of this
right, these denials of recognition are better understood as modifying not
the sovereign right itself, but the venerable legal presumption that
"effective control through internal processes" reflects the sovereign
political community's will." From international law's external standpoint,
sovereignty itself lies not in a given constitutional order (pouvoir
constitue), but in the underlying constituency (pouvoir constituant) whose
will to accept or repudiate that order must somehow be discerned.26
24.
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 23, at 123 (emphasis added). This language, of course,
parallels the self-determination language of the human rights Covenants quoted in the previous
note.
25. This "effective control" doctrine was the upshot ofThomas Jefferson's 1792 statement
in regard to revolutionary France: "'It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government
to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared."' H. LAUTERPACHT,
RECOGNMONIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125-26 (1947) (emphasis added). Historically, governments
that have maintained the obedience of their populations through internal processes-i.e., by any
means, however coercive, other than unlawful foreign intervention-have most often been accepted
as passing this test. See BRAD R. RoTh, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
136-49, 160-71, 253-354 (1999).
26. For a discussion of Carl Schmitt's "pouvoir constitu6" and "pouvoir constituant," see
ScHwAB, supra note 22, at 32-37.
Even claims for an international-law-based "democratic entitlement" do not intend to call into
question a political community's right to organize a government according to its own authentic will.
See G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990):
[T]he efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the
principle of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question each
State's sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic
and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other
States ....
Id. They do, however, problematize the standing of a usurping ruling apparatus, manifestly
[Vol. 56
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As states' empirical capacities to exercise unilateral control over many
areas of activity have diminished, sovereignty's continued significance has
frequently been called into question. In the international-juridical sense,
however, sovereignty is not an empirical condition, but a legal status.
Moreover, international legal norms-however much they multiply, and
even come to bear on states' internal conduct-are a product of, not an
abandonment of, state authority. Sovereignty may one day be superseded,
but not as a direct consequence of either the diminishing efficacy of
unilateral regulation or the proliferation of international legal norms. It
signifies not an absence of international legality, but a set of legal
premises.
The foundational principle of the international system, according to the
United Nations, is the "sovereign equality of all its [m]embers. ' '2' This
statement of principle is semantically inept, since it demands a reciprocal
renunciation of the same unlimited authority that it nominally invokes.
Indeed, in affirming and bolstering only such assertions of state prerogative
as are consistent with the international system's animating purposes, that
system necessarily qualifies the nature and scope of state prerogative.
Thus, within the discourse of international law, "sovereignty" functions
metaphorically, as an expressive reminder of certain legal presumptions
favoring the independence of the system's units, rather than literally, as an
indicator of a status beyond the reach of law.
unrepresentative of popular will, to assert the sovereign political community's rights against foreign
interference in its internal affairs. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in
International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 595 (1992) ("A regime that bases its legitimacy on
nothing more than the fact that it holds power exercises no 'sovereign' authority to object
to... prescriptions" required by the terms of the right to political participation.). Consequently, W.
Michael Reisman writes:
Cross-border military actions [that restore a freely elected government can be
characterized] as a violation of sovereignty only if one uses the term
anachronistically to mean the violation of some mystical survival of a monarchical
right that supposedly devolves jure gentium on whichever warlord seizes and
holds the presidential palace or if the term is used in the jurisprudentially bizarre
sense to mean that inanimate territory has political rights that preempt those of its
inhabitants.
W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT'LL. 866, 871 (1990).
27. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1. This juridical standard, of course, in no way denies the
reality of states' widely varying empirical capacities.
1025
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III. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND "BOUNDED PLURALISM" IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
A. Sovereignty as a Set of Legal Presumptions for a,
Pluralist Order
Respect for sovereignty pervades three aspects of the international legal
order's basic structure: (1) the recognized sources of law; (2) the interface
between the international and domestic legal systems; and (3) the
fundamental stricture against coercive interference in the internal affairs of
states. That is to say, sovereignty entails three presumptions: (1) a state is
presumed to be obligated only to the extent of its actual or constructive
consent; (2) a state's obligations, while fully binding internationally on the
state as a corporative entity, are presumed to have direct legal effect within
the state only to the extent that domestic law has incorporated them; and
(3) the inviolability of a state's territorial integrity and political
independence, as against the threat or use of force or "extreme economic
or political coercion, ',2 is presumed to withstand even the state's violation
of international legal norms. All three presumptions are rebuttable, but
nonetheless formidable. Sovereignty thus presents hurdles, both to the
establishment of new international norms and to the implementation of
existing norms.
These hurdles are subject to vigorous jurisprudential debate. If one
imputes to international law an inherent purpose to establish a universal
justice that transcends the boundaries of territorial communities, the
presumed state prerogatives unquestionably impede the global advance of
legality. Those who understand the project of international legality in this
way, therefore, typically portray sovereignty as the unconquered domain:
a realm of lawlessness that must recede for international law to advance.29
An alternative rhetorical move, still in keeping with this "transcendent
justice" approach, is a persuasive redefinition of sovereignty that strips it
of elements resistant to the grand design. Thus, a state's sovereignty is
simply identified with, and reduced to, the state's responsibility to fulfill
legal obligations.3 °
28. Report of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility art.
50(b), 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [198012 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l [hereinafter 19961LCArticles on State
Responsibility].
29. Critics of the expanding scope and competence of international legal institutions, of
course, similarly characterize sovereignty and international legality as rivals. See, e.g., RABKIN,
supra note 5 (discussing the idea that international agreements threaten the sovereign authority of
the United States).
30. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27; DENG ET AL., supra note 3, at 32-33;
[Vol. 56
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There is, however, an alternative conception of sovereignty's role in the
international legal system. In this conception, the contours of the system
reflect persistent and profound, albeit bounded, disagreement within its
membership as to what constitutes fundamental justice, especially in regard
to modes of internal political organization. To be sure, the boundaries of
the system's pluralism have narrowed progressively in the course of the
United Nations era, excluding Axis-era fascism from the outset,
colonialism and apartheid in the 1960s and '70s, and "ethnic cleansing"
and peculiarly unpopular and violent seizures of state power in the 1990s.
Nonetheless, the system continues to accommodate a wide-ranging
diversity of political moralities. Moreover, international legal processes
militate against powerful states' penchant for invoking universal principles
to rationalize unilateral (and typically self-serving) impositions upon weak
states (and subjugated "peoples"). If the operating principle of international
legality is understood to be "bounded pluralism" rather than "transcendent
justice," sovereignty-oriented constraints on the establishment and
implementation of international norms appear as a fundamental premise of,
rather than a mere impediment to, the project of international legality.
B. The Persistence of "Antiquated" Sovereignty Within
International Law
Seen in this light, even the most seemingly commonsensical
disparagements of traditional invocations of sovereignty require
qualification. For example, one highly respected commentator, in order to
shift the focus of sovereignty discourse to more "modem" usages of the
term, seeks to shake free of discredited usages as follows:
Broadly, one could see the "antiquated" definition of
"sovereignty" that should be "relegated" as something like the
notion of a nation-state's supreme absolute power and
authority over its subjects and territory, unfettered by any
higher law or rule (except perhaps ethical or religious
standards) unless the nation-state consents in an individual
and meaningful way. It could be characterized as the nation-
state's power to violate virgins, chop off heads, arbitrarily
confiscate property, torture citizens, and engage in all sorts of
other excessive and inappropriate actions.
Today, no sensible person would agree that this antiquated
version of sovereignty exists. A multitude of treaties and
customary international law norms impose international legal
Stacy, supra note 3, at 2044-46.
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constraints (at the least) that circumscribe extreme forms of
arbitrary actions even against a sovereign's own citizens.3
This statement is unexceptionable, so long as one highlights the generality
of the commentator's purpose in offering it. The particulars, however, are
less straightforward than they appear. The quoted passage (as I shall refer
to it hereafter)32 obscures complexities that pertain to each aspect of the
relationship between sovereignty and international legality:
(1) The recognized sources of law. The first sentence of the passage
suggests that a state is bound by "higher" law even where it does not
consent "in an individual and meaningful way."33 Perhaps this means
simply to reaffirm that states can become bound to customary international
human rights norms collectively and implicitly, as a result of their
acquiescence in (largely rhetorical) patterns of practice. But "higher" may
leave the impression that the applicable norms are rooted in something
other than, and therefore can be interpreted without regard to,
manifestations of the will of the law-making community of states. A norm
against violating virgins might be uncontroversially derived from such
manifestations (surely, no state has persistently objected that it has such a
prerogative), but the same cannot be said of a norm against arbitrarily
confiscating property, especially with respect to a common understanding
of what counts as arbitrariness in this field.
The burden falls on one who asserts the existence of the legal obligation
to adduce the state practice and opiniojuris that establish the customary
norm--or, in the alternative, to survey a cross-section of the world's legal
systems to establish a general principle of law recognized by the
community of nations.34 Moreover, even a norm discerned by these
methods would not bind an outlier state that has persistently objected,
except upon an additional showing that "the international community of
States as a whole" recognizes the norm as a "peremptory" one (jus cogens)
"from which no derogation is permitted."35
31. Jackson, supra note 6, at 790.
32. Hopefully, Professor Jackson will forgive my exploitation of this quotation. He clearly
intended it not as a rigorous account of this subject matter, but as a throw-away reference to a
subject other than the one he wished to examine in detail. I have seized on this quotation only
because it so well reflects a conventional wisdom that tends to be unquestioningly accepted, but that
is misleading as to the details of the relationship between state sovereignty and international
legality. Since the critique that follows is not directed against Professor Jackson's main point, the
text deliberately avoids associating him by name with the criticized passage.
33. Jackson, supra note 6, at 790.
34. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 38(1)(c)
(empowering the Court to apply "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"). The
more modern "community of nations" language is found in the ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 15(2).
35. Little aboutjus cogens is uncontroversially established, but this language from the Vienna
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In determinations of whether a purported norm counts as international
law, sovereignty plays a dual role. In one respect, it is simply a residuum:
generally speaking, states are free to the extent that no legal obligation is
affirmatively established.36 In the second respect, it represents the
considerations that underlie the burden of proof in a law-finding process
that inevitably contains a teleological component. The primary
methodological problem in ascertaining the existence of a legal norm is not
one of "research design," but of foundational principle: disputes that
purport to turn on the strength of the adduced evidence are most frequently,
in reality, disputes about the nature and strength of the presumption that
states remain juridically free to act as they choose. Thus, a jurist's
conclusion may, in effect, turn on whether he or she ascribes to the project
of international legality a telos of "transcendent justice" or of "bounded
pluralism."
(2) The interface between the international and domestic legal systems.
The earlier-quoted passage goes beyond positing that all states are legally
obligated not "to violate virgins, chop off heads, arbitrarily confiscate
property, torture citizens, and engage in all sorts of other excessive and
inappropriate actions."37 Rather, it disputes the "nation-state's supreme
absolute power ' '3 -meaning, in this context, its legal authority rather than
its empirical capacity-to commit that parade of horribles.
This denial of sovereign authority might be taken to imply that
international law contains something akin to the United States
Constitution's Supremacy Clause,39 which legally nullifies all state-level
exertions of authority that transgress federal constitutional norms, and
which forms part of a structure providing for the justiciability, in both
federal and state courts, of the validity of state acts under the federal
constitution.40 The international legal system, however, contains no such
operating principles.
The international system and domestic systems operate on different
legal planes, and their interconnections are highly differentiated and
complex. It is true that a state "may not invoke the provisions of its internal
Convention on the Law of Treaties indicates that international law, in principle, includes such
"super-norms." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 352.
36. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7). The precise
nature of the presumption is actually more complicated and controvertible: as occurred in the Lotus
case itself, sovereignty as presumed freedom may clash with sovereignty as presumed exclusivity
of territorial control. See Arrest Warrant of I I April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1,
paras. 13-16 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume).
37. Jackson, supra note 6, at 790.
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 2.
40. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1824).
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law as justification for its failure to perform" its international legal
obligations.4' Yet states' adoption of international obligations does not
entail renunciation of the ultimate authority to violate those obligations for
the sake of what they deem, unilaterally, to be the national interest, thereby
incurring whatever sanctions the international community may duly inflict
on the state.42 And even within its own plane, international law cannot treat
transgressive state acts as simply null and void, for such acts, however
wrongful, successfully create certain legal facts that the international
system is bound to acknowledge.
For example, even if, as the quoted passage asserts, a state's "arbitrary
confiscation" of a complainant's real property breaches an international
legal obligation, it does not follow that international law recognizes the
continued validity of the complainant's title to that property. Even though
the state may owe reparation, it likely has the unilateral authority, as part
of its "permanent sovereignty... over... natural resources," to determine
the ownership of any real property in its territory.43
Far more importantly, where domestic systems authorize, as they
frequently do, acts that breach international obligations,
individuals-including even the highest officials-who act pursuant to
such authorization must be presumed to do so within the scope of the
state's ultimate authority over public order in its territory. These
individuals cannot be held personally liable in the international system
unless states have renounced-expressly or tacitly, as in the case of the
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, at art. 27. The provision
applies expressly to treaty obligations, but the same principle applies to customary obligations.
42. "International law... recognizes the power-though not the right-to break a treaty and
abide the international consequences." Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
168 (1972). This comports with the Bodinian conception of sovereignty: a prince is bound by the
covenants he undertakes except when, in his unilateral judgment, "they cease to satisfy the claims
ofjustice." BODIN, supra note 12, at 30. Sovereignty thus does not negate the existence of a legal
obligation; rather, as Carl Schmitt puts it,"sovereign is he who decides on the exception." SCHMITT,
supra note 7, at 5. Schmitt goes so far as to say that "[i]f individual states no longer have the power
to declare the exception, ... then they no longer enjoy the status of states." Id. at ii.
43. See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (approved 120-6-10, over the objection
of some capital-exporting states). This issue has some practical significance in regard to United
States efforts to penalize persons, of whatever nationality, who may "traffic" in properties
confiscated by the Cuban Government. See 22 U.S.C. § 6091 (2000) (codifying section 401 of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996).
(Vol. 56
DUNWODY COMM4ENTARY
treaty-based and customary law of war crimes 44-- not only the practices
themselves, but also the legal capacity to authorize them.45
The significance of this principle to the United States and its nationals
is manifest. In the domestic law of the United States, any effect of
customary international law (under the rubric of "federal common law")
44. Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947) ("He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action
moves outside its competence under international law.").
45. Functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae) presumptively bars legal action against
foreign individuals for acts committed within their own national territory under their state's official
authority. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98
AM. J. INT'LL. 407,412-13 (2004). Given the state's presumptive last word on public order in the
territory, functional immunity is a personal defense that reflects the operation of the non-
retroactivity principle in the criminal context, and of choice-of-law principles in the civil context.
Thus, Antonio Cassese construes immunity ratione materiae as, not a procedural bar to jurisdiction,
but a "substantive defence," available to "any dejure or de facto State agent" performing official
acts, establishing that the "violation is not legally imputable to [the agent] but to his state."
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 266 (2003); accord Akande, supra, at 412-15;
see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 168, 175-76 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (stating that breaches of
international obligation are ordinarily attributed to the state alone and that nullum crimen sine lege
can be "read to mean that international law must have prohibited the act as committed by an
individual rather than by a state"). Although United States courts in Alien Tort Statute decisions
have given little express attention to state agents' presumptive immunities ratione materiae, the
Supreme Court's recent tightening of the standards for such civil suits may effectively satisfy the
concern. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004) (implying that such suits can
prevail against only state policies "so bad that those who enforce them become enemies of the
human race").
On the above rationale, whereas a state can always waive the immunity ratione personae of its
diplomatic representatives (which shields them from having to answer even for private wrongs so
long as they hold their positions), a state can expressly or constructively waive its agents' immunity
ratione materiae for specified acts only in advance of their commission. See Regina v. Bos St.
Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Pinochet), I A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (finding that the coming
into force of the Torture Convention, with its grant of universal jurisdiction over official acts of
torture, is what conclusively removes torture from the recognized scope of official authority and
permits prosecution of acts occurring from that time forward).
Beyond this, functional immunity serves as a corollary to state immunity, so as not to allow the
use of prosecutions and lawsuits against officials to circumvent the immunities attaching to the state
itself. This further aspect broadens the scope of the immunity. Thus, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson
noted in the final Pinochet extradition proceeding before the British House of Lords, "[a]ctions
which are criminal under the local law can still have been done officially and therefore give rise to
immunity ratione materiae." Id. at 203; see also Arrest Warrant of I 1 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 1, para. 61 (Feb. 14) (stating that a domestic court may try an otherwise immune foreign
official only "in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity"). On
the other hand, logic dictates that within this additional range, the immunity belongs solely to the
state, which should be able to waive it post hoc. The potential for confusion, and consequent
injustice, in this area is substantial.
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is displaced by a "controlling executive or legislative act. 46 The status of
treaties is more complex. Those bearing most centrally on public order,
such as the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), are considered "non-self-executing"; they
bind the United States on the international plane, but they have no direct
effect on internal legal obligations.47
"Self-executing" treaties have internal legal effects, but subsequent
federal legislation prevails over these to the full extent of any
contradiction.48 Moreover, the treaty interpretations that prevail are those
of United States courts, not international or foreign courts, and even
express doctrine favors judicial acceptance of Executive Branch
interpretations.49 In practice, United States courts have, at the Executive's
behest, adopted some notably improbable interpretations of treaty
standards. For example, the Supreme Court has held, contrary to virtually
all international juridical opinion, that the Drug EnforcementAgency's
abduction of a Mexican national from his country, over Mexico's
objection, to stand trial in the United States did not violate the United
States-Mexico extradition treaty,50 and that the duty of non-refoulement,
contained in legislation purporting fully to implement a treaty obligation,
did not apply to the return of refugees to the country of their persecution
where the refugees were intercepted on the high seas."'
Thus, the textbook assertion that international law is "part of our law"52
is highly misleading. International law's incorporation into United States
law is strictly subordinated to domestic sources of authority.
As a policy matter, one may wish to denounce United States resistance
to the direct internal effect of international law as parochial and outmoded.
Yet authority and policy are two separate questions. The United States has
the sovereign authority to resist that direct effect, regardless of whether it
ought to exercise that authority. So, too, does every other state. To the
46. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For an instructive summary of the
limited status of international law in United States law, see Committee of United States Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
47. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 372 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that even if the
ICCPR or the Charter of the Organization of American States "were to ban the imposition of the
death penalty, neither is binding on federal courts," as these treaties are "non-self-executing"); 138
CONG. REC. S4781 (1992) (statement of Sen. Pell) (recounting the Senate's declaration that the
ICCPR's substantive provisions are non-self-executing).
48. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
49. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.").
50. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992).
51. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993).
52. The oft-repeated line comes from The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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extent that governmental conduct, albeit in breach of international legal
obligations, is internally authoritative, an external legal system has a
presumptive (albeit paradoxical) duty under international law to
acknowledge it as the last word on public order in the territory.
Thus, contrary to the implications of the quoted passage, the nation-
state does indeed possess the ultimate authority, even though not the
right,53 to "engage in all sorts of... excessive and inappropriate actions."54
World federalism may or may not be a worthy policy goal, but it is not the
current juridical reality. The open juridical questions concern the scope of
exceptions to the basic rule that international law has only such direct
internal effects as domestic law establishes, exceptions as to which
"transcendent justice" and "bounded pluralist" approaches may generate
conflicting answers.
(3) The fundamental stricture against coercive intervention. The quoted
passage denies the state's "supreme absolute power and authority over its
subjects and territory."" But apart from the special powers entrusted to the
United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, no state
or intergovernmental organization has--or even claims-law enforcement
53. The international system does possess mechanisms by which states, and even nonstate
actors, may pursue remedies for breaches of international obligations. These mechanisms, however,
are limited by the principle of sovereign consent. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
reflects the presumption that no self-respecting state will allow its inherently governmental (as
opposed to its purely commercial) conduct to be subjected to judgment in the courts of a coequal
state. "It has become an established rule that between two equals, one cannot exercise sovereign
will or power over the other, 'Par in parem non habet imperium."' Sompong Sucharitkul,
Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, in 149 RECUEIL DES COURS 87, 117
(1977). But see Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 745-65 (2003) (arguing provocatively that
this is essentially a rule of comity, rather than of international law, and should therefore give way
in respect of "most, if not all, activity that constitutes human rights offenses").
States do consent to thejurisdiction of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, but only
selectively, and even then sometimes in a highly qualified manner. Thus, for example, even those
states parties to the ICCPR that "recognize[' the competence" of the Human Rights Committee to
consider adverse "communications," either from states under the optional Article 41 procedure or
from individuals under the First Optional Protocol, are not legally bound to comply with the
Committee's "views." See ICCPR, supra note 23, at arts. 41-42; Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 302. Although it surely does not acknowledge the state as the authoritative interpreter of
its own obligations, even with respect to internal public order, the international legal system does
not ordinarily obligate the state to yield the last word to a particular institution that it may consider
biased against its interests and values. The result is that the power of authoritative interpretation is
often diffused throughout the community of states as a whole and is, therefore, difficult to bring
cohesively to bear.
54. Jackson, supra note 6, at 790.
55. Id.
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authority within the territory of a foreign state.56 The state's monopoly over
the authorization of the use of force in its territory, the inner core of
sovereignty, withstands its failures to uphold international obligations.5 7
Consequently, although no aspect of state conduct toward its own
nationals may now be considered outside the scope of international
obligation and scrutiny, implementation of human rights obligations is still
subject to the control of sovereign states.5" Human rights instruments have
not included intrusive implementation mechanisms, and no such
mechanisms can be inferred from general international law. At least
presumptively, activities within the state, undertaken by foreigners to
secure the state's compliance with human rights norms, remain subject to
state consent.5 a
Furthermore, absent Chapter VII-based resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council, foreign states and intergovernmental
organizations may lawfully employ only limited measures to exert pressure
on human rights violators. The most straightforward stricture is the
56. "A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another
state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2) (1987); see
also I OPPENHEIM'SINTERNATIONALLAW§ 119, at 387-88 (Sir Robert Jennings& Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("It is... a breach of international law for a state without permission to send
its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a
crime.").
57. Max Weber famously spoke of the state as the institution "that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use ofphysicalforce within a given territory." MAX WEBER, Politics
as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds. & trans., 1958). From a juridical standpoint, however, it is more accurate to say that the
monopoly pertains to the authorization, not to the actual use, of force. For example, the central
authorities may authorize subordinate governmental units or private contractors to exercise policing
functions, may allow private persons to use force in circumstances of self-defense or necessity, or
may consent to the introduction of foreign forces for specified purposes.
58. It is worthwhile to recall that Bodin himself conceived of sovereignty not as the absence
of obligation, but as the absence of any higher authority to impose compliance. See BODIN, supra
note 12, at 29-31. The fact that states nowadays undertake wide-ranging obligations regarding
internal practices in no way dilutes sovereignty, so conceived.
59. See G.A. Res. 46/182, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49/Annex (1991) (acknowledging that humanitarian operations within a state's territory
require the state's consent). Third World states have collectively insisted, at least rhetorically, on
maintaining this principle, stressing "that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full
respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of host countries, and
should be initiated in response to a request or with the approval of these States." Declaration ofthe
South Summit para. 54, Group of Seventy-Seven at the U.N. (Apr. 10-14, 2000), available at
http://www.g77.org/main/docs/DeclarationG77Summit.doc. See generally Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 5 1, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/36/5 I/Annex (1981) (passed 120-22-6,
over the dissenting votes of Western states) (asserting a duty "to refrain from any economic,
political or military activity in the territory of another State without its consent").
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prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of states, contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.6" As the International Court of Justice made clear in the
Nicaragua case, allegations of human rights abuse cannot be invoked to
justify armed efforts, direct or by proxy, to destabilize a government.6
Economic coercion and political interference directed toward regime
change also consistently receive a frosty reception in resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly and other intergovernmental groups,62
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134-35 (June 27),
paras. 267-68. The Nicaragua decision confirmed the legal significance of the rhetoric quoted in
an earlier note:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 23, at 123.
The 132-member "G-77" bloc of developing countries recently reaffirmed its commitment to
this principle in inflexible terms:
We reaffirm that every State has the inalienable right to choose political,
economic, social and cultural systems of its own, without interference in any form
by other States.
We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian
assistance and other activities of the United Nations. We reject the so-called
"right" of humanitarian intervention; which has no legal basis in the United
Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law.
Declaration of the South Summit, supra note 59, at paras. 49, 54.
62. "No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its
sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind." Friendly Relations Declaration,
supra note 23, at 123; see also G.A. Res. 58/198, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/198 (2004) (125-1-37) (urging elimination of using "unilateral coercive economic
measures against developing countries that are not authorized by relevant organs of the United
Nations or are inconsistent with the principles of international law as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations and that contravene the basic principles of the multilateral trading system"); G.A.
Res. 45/151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (111-29-
11) (appealing to all states "to abstain from financing or providing... overt or covert support for
political parties or groups"). For expressions of opposition to concrete measures, see G.A. Res.
58/7, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/7 (2003) (adopted 179-3-2) (repudiating the
United States' secondary boycott against Cuba); Economic Coercive Measures Against Panama,
Latin Am. Econ. Sys. Doc. No. 271 (Mar. 29, 1988) (repudiating United States economic sanctions
imposed following the removal of President Eric Arturo Delvalle), excerpted in UNITED STATEs
although the rules pertaining to these measures are far less clear. Some
unilateral sanctions-such as suspensions of aid and trade and withdrawal
of diplomatic relations-fall within the scope of a sanctioning state's own
sovereign prerogatives, whereas others, such as secondary boycotts (i.e.,
coercive interference with the target state's economic relations with third
states) and covert funding of opposition political groups, would seem to
cross the line into presumptively unlawful intervention.
Opinion appears to be divided on whether such nonforcible coercive
acts could be justified as countermeasures-proportionate reprisals against
the legal rights of states-in response to violations of human rights
obligations owed the international community.63 The lesser developed
countries have long feared that licensing such measures would invite neo-
colonialism in the guise of human rights enforcement. The 1996 version
of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility included an express prohibition on the use, as a
countermeasure, of "extreme economic or political coercion designed to
endanger the territorial integrity or political independence of the State
which has committed the internationally wrongful act."' The final version,
submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration in 2001,65 omitted
this clause, but retained restrictions to more or less the same effect.
66
ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA 286,286-87 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove eds., 1993).
63. See Report of the Secretary-General on Economic Measures as a Means ofPolitical or
Economic Coercion against Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 44/125, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at para. 23, U.N. Doc. A/44/510 (1989) (indicating division of opinion on whether
any exception could be made for measures in furtherance ofhuman rights compliance); Declaration
of the South Summit, supra note 59, at para. 48 (rejecting all "forms of coercive economic
measures, including unilateral sanctions against developing countries," without mentioning any
exception for countermeasures against human rights violators). Given the lack of any effort to erect
a collective apparatus for determining when such countermeasures would be appropriate and for
policing their proportionality, there is ample reason to question whether human rights-based
justifications of otherwise unlawful measures have achieved international acceptance.
64. 1996 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28, at art. 50(b).
65. Report ofthe International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility ofStates
for Internationally WrongfulActs, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/1 0
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility]. ILC Special Rapporteur James
Crawford noted that "'either the countermeasures are disproportionate, in which case they are
excluded by the principle of proportionality, or they are not, in which case they will necessarily be
a response to extreme wrongdoing causing injuries which have not been redressed."' David J.
Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 831 (2002).
66. 2001 ILCArticles on State Responsibility, supra note 65, at art. 49 ("An injured State
may only take countermeasures.., in order to induce [the wrongdoing] State to comply with its
obligations .... ); id. at art. 51 ("Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury
suffered .... "). Moreover, Article 54, in allowing for responses by "[any State other than an
injured State" to breaches of those obligations recognized in Article 48 as being "owed to the
international community as a whole," mentions only "lawful measures," rather than
countermeasures.
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Thus, however paradoxically, human rights norms are, as a matter of
legal presumption, obligatory but not compulsory. States are, at once,
legally bound by obligations and legally protected from the very coercion
that may be required to assure their compliance. Human rights norms do
not, in and of themselves, vitiate the legal constraints on the application of
power across territorial boundaries. Frustrated by such legal constraints,
W. Michael Reisman has complained that "[b]ecause rights without
remedies are not rights at all, prohibiting the unilateral vindication of clear
violations of rights when multilateral possibilities do not obtain is virtually
to terminate those rights."67 As Reisman himself acknowledges, however,
routine circumvention of those constraints would erode the underpinnings
of the system that makes those rights possible.6"
Thus, sovereignty's relationship to international law is far more
nuanced than is generally supposed. In all three areas surveyed-the
recognized sources of law, the interface between the international and
domestic legal systems, and the fundamental stricture against coercive
intervention-sovereign prerogative amounts to a set of legal
presumptions. To say that these are presumptions is to say that any or all
of them may be rebuttable; the basic rules admit of many exceptions, some
clearly established and others arguable. But even if one aims ultimately for
the exception to swallow the rule-the "transcendentjustice" approach-it
is important for analytical purposes not to misidentify the exception as the
rule.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF "BOUNDED PLURALISM" AS THE BASIS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Rather than dismissing sovereignty-oriented presumptions as defects in
the international legal order, to be progressively eradicated as the system
develops, I wish to suggest a principled defense, albeit qualified, of the
barriers that these presumptions pose. This defense has two parts, one
pertaining to the foundations of political morality, and the other to the
practicalities of international policy.
A. State Sovereignty and Political Morality
The moral justification of a pluralist international order rests on the
assertion of a collective moral right to self-determination. This assertion
67. Reisman, supra note 26, at 875.
68. W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 516, 516-17 (2004) ("Our international legal system is scarcely imaginable without"
territorial communities having the right to govern themselves "without interference"; "state
sovereignty prevails in all but the most egregious instances of widespread human rights
violations.").
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is frequently associated with the claim that human beings' very identities
are shaped by the communities in which they are "radically situated," and
that, consequently, political values can be assessed only within the
framework of a given community's distinctive character and traditions. 9
This claim questionably assumes not only that the individual lacks a
cognizable identity independent of relationships that are pre-established
and impervious to revision upon rational reflection, but also that the
"constitutive" communities being invoked are coextensive with existing
political communities. A very different argument for the collective right,
however, can be made from premises that are fully consistent with
ontological individualism, moral universalism, and political rationalism.
This argument emphasizes not the individual's embeddedness in a
collective past, but the individual's present and future dependence on
collective projects that call for distinctively political decisions. On this
account, justice remains subject to the boundaries of political community,
not for cultural reasons, but for practical ones.
The "transcendent justice" approach to the international legal order is
traceable to a tendency in contemporary political thought known as
deontological, or neutralist, liberalism.7" Deontological liberalism gives
categorical priority to the imperative of respect for the human subject as a
rational chooser of its own ends.7 This approach contrasts with
teleological approaches to liberal political morality that seek to maximize
the realization of criteria of social well-being, whether such criteria reflect
aggregated subjective preferences (utilitarianism) or an authoritative
conception of the good life (perfectionism).' Deontological liberalism
regards human rights as inherent in the human person, whereas utilitarians
and perfectionists (as well as those who reject liberalism's individualistic
ontological premises) may assert moral grounds on which political
69. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LLBERAusM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE 21 (1982).
70. The starting point for discussions of "deontology" in contemporary political theory is
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE (rev. ed. 1999). The associated issues have been extensively
debated. See, e.g., RONALD BENER, WHAT'S THE MATTER wrrH LIBERAUaSM? 36 (1992)
(repudiating the deontological distinction between "the right" and "the good," and criticizing
liberalism as excluding"a sense ofmeaningful collective purpose"); WnInAMA. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES (1991) (questioning Rawls's attempt at constructing a political liberalism that is
substantially neutral regarding the human good); SANDEL, supra note 69 (criticizing the
deontological account of the human subject as implausible); GEORGE SHER, BEYONDNEUTRALrrY:
PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS (1997) (arguing that a non-neutral state can realize Rawls's goals
more effectively than can a neutral state, without compromising liberal values). An excellent
summary of the issues is contained in WI.L KYMuCKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE
9-99 (1989), which explores the various criticisms of deontological liberalism and examines the
resources that are available to meet those criticisms.
71. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 24-36.
72. See id.
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institutions ought to create liberal legal rights.73 Deontologists derive
liberal rights directly from first principles and essentially reduce the moral
role of political institutions to the recognition and implementation of these
rights.74
Deontological liberalism has implications for the appropriate role of
politics in social life and thus for the moral status of the state.
Deontologists divide the universe of moral issues into two realms: matters
of "the right" and matters of "the good."'75 "The right" is understoodito
include questions of justice, in the peculiar sense of fairness in weighing
the competing claims of end-choosing human subjects; it is associated with
a standard list of liberal rights that are deemed to be universally applicable
and neutrally protective of end-choosing subjects.76 "The good" is
understood to include questions of the nature of the good life and the
proper objects of human striving, answers to which must be derived from
one of many competing "comprehensive doctrines of human flourishing.""
As these doctrines are deemed to be hopelessly controversial, the
conflicting versions of "the good" that they generate are subordinated to a
transcendent conception of "the right."78 This line of thought tends to
produce a moral absolutism as to "the right" and a moral subjectivism as
to "the good."'79
From here it is a short step---at least psychologically, if not quite so,
philosophically-to the conclusion that politics has no legitimate role in
determinations of either the right or the good. Questions of the right are to
be decided in a realm above politics, by deduction from first principles,
whereas questions of the good are to be decided in a realm below politics,
by the independent determinations of individuals, alone or in freely chosen
73. See id.
74. See id. Although Rawls was a crucial figure in the development of this deontological
approach to human rights, his own work after A Theory of Justice developed in a divergent
direction. The natural law overtones of the early work were replaced by much more contingent
formulations, especially as applied expressly to international political morality. See John Rawls, The
Law of Peoples, 20 CRrICAL INQUIRY 36 (1993). As a result, Rawls-inspired critics of sovereignty
have found themselves sharply at odds with their mentor. See, e.g., Fernando R. Tes6n, The
Rawlsian Theory of International Law, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 79,98 (1995) (complaining that the
later work has "embraced a more relativistic, context-based conception of justice and political
morality, in which rights and liberties no longer had a foundation in higher principles or liberal
views of human nature").
75. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 24-36.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. Deontologists typically deny that this subjectivism is rooted in skepticism, but
rather they assert that even objectively valid judgments about the good life can produce "the good"
only when the individuals in question voluntarily embrace them. See KYMLICKA, supra note 70, at
12.
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association. Logic does not compel this move. The deontological scheme
formally concerns the substantive grounds, not the procedural rules, for
determinations about justice and thus may serve solely to inform
participants in the political process, rather than to justify imposing
authority from outside that process. However, the assertion that "the right"
is independent of, rather than dependent upon, a necessarily controversial
judgment about "the good" suggests an objectivity and a universality of
"the right" that tend to weigh against deference to the political process in
this realm. The widespread popularity of judicial review of legislation
among deontological liberals confirms this tendency. °
If justice is universal, rather than the product of a decision at a
particular time and place, and if the good life is purely a matter of
individual prerogative, then the enterprise of politics is appropriately
confined to a limited and subordinate set of purposes. It follows then that
neither the project of the state, nor the positive law that derives from that
project, can properly have an independent moral significance."'
There is good reason, however, to doubt that justice can be specified
independent of a collective adoption of a comprehensive doctrine of human
flourishing (or of a collective adoption of a particular accommodation
among some such doctrines to the exclusion of others), and therefore that
universal rights can fully transcend the decisions of particular political
communities about the nature of the good society wherein the good life is
pursued. By all accounts, individual pursuit of the good life requires the
existence of certain nondivisible public goods. The creation of these public
goods is burdened by collective action problems (e.g., the temptation to be
a free rider), the solution to which frequently requires collective decisions
authorizing coercive implementation. 2 Deontological liberals believe that
such collective decisions can be limited to those that can be justified
80. Such a conclusion assumes away, or at least judges unworthy of moral regard, the
prevalence of fundamental disagreement about justice. Positive law serves as a working resolution
of that disagreement for a particular time and place. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF
LEGISLATION (1999). For an atypical deontological approach that embraces politics (and rejects
judicial review), see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
81. For a noteworthy exposition of such a view, see generally FERNANDO R. TESON,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALIrY (1988).
82. Social life, by its nature, presents myriad coordination problems. However much one may
wish to exalt the self-actualizing individual, individual aspirations cannot be realized-or often
even conceived-without others' coordinate actions and forbearances that combine to establish the
infrastructure for that realization (just as a career as a cellist presupposes compositions, instruments,
orchestras, and orchestra halls, which themselves presuppose complex social institutions, and so
on in regression). The coordination of actions and forbearances depends, in turn, on decisions
attributable to and binding on some collectivity, backed by a capacity for compulsion that militates
against free riders and other spoilers.
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"neutrally," without reference to a contentious conception of "the good." 3
Since human equality entails, from the deontological perspective, an equal
prerogative for each individual to pursue his or her own conception of the
good life,justice entails freedom from all "non-neutral" compulsion.14 But
if the fundamental interests of end-choosing human subjects turn outto be
rival, one can establish priorities only by comparatively evaluating, in light
of preferred conceptions of the good life, the ends that those subjects might
choose.85
At the core of the current-day human rights movement is the quest to
bring about the conditions of a dignified human existence. Human rights
thus entail not merely duties to avoid violating human dignity by discrete
and direct acts of violence, but further duties to affirmatively protect the
right-bearer from violence and from analogous inflictions with similarly
dehumanizing effects. Beyond those lie duties to take all necessary
measures to secure for all right-bearers (within the limits of what is
materially feasible) the conditions that permit human potentialities to be
realized. The proliferation of internationally certified human rights-now
encompassing "first-generation" civil and political rights well beyond
inviolability of the physical integrity of the person, "second-generation"
economic and social rights, and "third-generation" collective rights to the
minimal conditions of societal flourishing-represents a series of efforts
to correct for the manifest inadequacy of simple negative imperatives.8 6
Human rights are typically characterized as a priori constraints on the
pursuit of political ends. The more holistically rights claims address human
dignity, however, the more inexorably and expansively do they appropriate
the space of politics. Invocation of the term "human rights" altogether fails
to preempt political contestation because competing views of how to
83. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 24-36.
84. Thus, Jack Donnelly can assert, in a quintessential expression of the "transcendent
justice" approach, that universal human rights entail the proposition that "[h]ow one chooses to lead
one's life, subject only to minimum requirements of law and public order, is a private matter-no
matter how publicly one leads that life." Jack Donnelly, Unfinished Business: Failure of
Imagination Preserves Inequality and Jeopardizes the Universality of Human Rights, 31 PS: POL.
SCL & POL. 530, 533 (1998). This reflects an idiosyncratic understanding of social interaction.
Discrete human lives intersect and collectively generate a moral environment that, in turn,
conditions the possibilities for individual pursuit of the good life. One can support the goal of
Donnelly's statement-the establishment of gay rights--without predicating it on a claim that is
both philosophically dubious and, far from being "universally" embraced, widely rejected even in
generally liberal societies.
85. For an elaboration of the argument that liberalism's core encompasses rival freedoms that
cannot be prioritized by deduction, see JOHN GRAY, Two FACES OF LmERALIsM 69-104 (2000).
86. One can, of course, reject this proliferation, and insist that only "first-generation" rights
should be considered human rights. See Maurice Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?,
DAEDALUS, Fall 1983, at 1, 10-17. That insistence, however, has not gained wide acceptance in the
contemporary human rights movement.
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prioritize and how to accomplish the posited ends constitute the very core
of politics."
Sovereignty takes on moral importance, then, not because political
communities are in any way "organic,""8 but because fundamental human
concerns necessitate uniquely political decisions. The state-as opposed
to- nonterritorial or microterritorial communities rooted in sentimental
attachment rather than potential for order-creation, and as opposed to an
international community encompassing an unmanageable multiplicity of
interests and values-represents the only community in the name of which
the ineluctably contentious decisions needed to structure social life can be
effectively made and enforced. Liberal imperatives of "equal concern and
respect"89 presuppose a discrete political community in which members
can make reciprocal demands on one another-often quite exacting ones,
such as redistributive taxation and military service-on the basis of
distinctive decisions ascribable to the whole. A capacity for such political
decisions conceptually precedes all talk of democracy: the exercise of
sovereignty is what there is to be democratic about.
One could go so far as to say that sovereignty, as the consummation of
the self-determination of peoples, is not only itself a human right, but
indeed-in light of common Article 1 of the human rights Covenants-the
first human right (in the sense of providing a foundation for, not morally
outweighing, other human rights).9" Nonetheless, such rhetoric should not
be allowed to obscure the inherent limitation. However broad the range of
controvertible choices as to political, economic, social, and cultural
systems, self-determination cannot justifiably be exercised so as to
altogether flout the moral purposes that underlie the collective right itself.
Still, the collective choices that inevitably remain subject to
contestation within political communities include the kinds of choices over
which civil wars are fought. In socioeconomically or ethnically polarized
polities, the stakes may be so consequential that the losing contestants have
insufficient motive to remain loyal to the prevailing processes of decision.
The potential for such an unmediated clash of social forces augurs
decisions, of both government and opposition, to employ harsh means
against what appear, by light of their particular projects of public order, as
threats to the community's vital interests.9
87. For an exploration of the the consequences of this reality for "rights talk," see BEINER,
supra note 70, at 80-97.
88. As discussed above, political communities are not "organic" because they are not based
on ethnic or cultural ties, and do not presuppose a "radically situated" human subject.
89. RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-83 (1977) (defining liberalism in
these terms).
90. See ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 23, at art. 1.
91. Some readers may have difficulty believing that advocates of plausible conceptions of
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A duty not to intervene in a foreign political community's internal
conflict, so far as that duty extends, is a duty to respect patterns of
coercion, and even violence, within a collectivity of which one is not a
member. It is not akin to a duty to allow individuals peacefully to pursue
their own good in their own way. Nor is it a matter of minding one's own
business; the human costs of such conflicts are manifestly the business of
all humanity. Rather, the duty of outsiders is to appreciate, in their
assessment of the propriety of imposing their own will, the unshared
collective stake that members of a given political community have in the
outcomes of decisions about the fundamental direction of social life in the
territory. Outsiders do not have standing to be partisans in another
community's conflict; yet, their assessments of distant crises, apart from
being prone to sophomoric oversimplification and deliberate manipulation,
tend disproportionately to reflect the perspectives of those conflict
participants with whom they personally most closely identify. The duty to
refrain from coercive interference, while overcome in some class of
unambiguously catastrophic cases, properly withstands the strong and
wholesome moral intuition to take on others' causes as one's own.92
Thus, even apart from pragmatic considerations, the international
order's pluralism should never be confused with the "gorgeous mosaic"93
pluralism of the liberal imagination, in which an overarching unity as to
"the right" renders inoffensive, and even enriching, the persistence of
differences over "the good." As long as radical disagreement aboutjustice
remains part of the human condition, an international pluralism, even in its
ideal form, will at moments be a tense and almost unbearably ugly
pluralism, an accommodation among political communities dominated by
incompatible positions on matters of justice and injustice, freedom and
tyranny, and, ultimately, life and death.
"equal concern and respect" can be found on both sides of such confrontations. Yet this is
frequently the case, even where key actors on one or both sides might properly be classified as
"thugs." For example, the Chilean coup of 1973, the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan internal armed
conflicts of the 1980s, and the attempted Venezuelan coup of 2002-all conflicts rooted in
socioeconomic polarization divisions-sharply divided the respective societies, including their
liberal-democratic elements. Ethnic polarization is, if anything, even more likely to pit sincerely
held, but clashing, conceptions of fairness against one another in conflicts that are beyond the
capacity of institutions to contain.
92. My position on these matters is partly inspired by Michael Walzer's landmark defense
of the principle of nonintervention. See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing ofStates: A Response
to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 209 (1980). 1 seek, however, to avoid Walzer's reliance on a
culture-based argument for a presumptive "fit" between political communities and their
governments. Id. at 212.
93. Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo and former New York City Mayor David
Dinkins have used this term to describe New York's cultural diversity. Calvin Sims, To Save
Money, City Hall Considers Cutting Parades, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at B5.
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B. State Sovereignty and International Policy
The boundaries of the international legal order's pluralism are
considerably broader than the collective moral right to self-determination
alone would dictate. These boundaries additionally reflect both the
system's policy goal of constraining cross-border exercises of power by
presumptively untrustworthy actors, and its political need for broad-based
support in a diverse international community.
In addition to encompassing a multiplicity of values, the international
community encompasses a multiplicity of interests. Moreover, poor and
weak states-typically natural resource-exporting, dependent on foreign
capital, and historically dominated from abroad-have long perceived
systematic contradictions between their interests and those of the rich and
powerful states. Although many Western observers nowadays dismiss
Third World governments' complaints of neo-colonialism and neo-
imperialism as willful distractions from more proximate causes of local
problems, distrust of the more powerful states' intentions continues to be
widely and strongly felt among inhabitants of the weaker states. Thus,
there remains substantial popular backing within these states for insistence
on maintaining sovereign equality as the bedrock principle of any scheme
of international cooperation.
Furthermore, external impositions-affected, as they predictably are,
by self-interest and arrogance--cannot lightly be presumed to be salutary.
In regard to armed humanitarian intervention, for example, rich and
powerful countries are seldom willing to invest substantial blood and
treasure for moral objectives alone. At best, armed interventions occur in
locations (e.g., in Kosovo rather than in far more devastated African
regions)94 and in ways (e.g., by aerial bombardment of civilian
infrastructure rather than ground-troop confrontation of ginocidaires)9"
that reflect political rather than moral priorities. At worst, the interests
motivating the external investment may distort the mission's goals (as has
been alleged in the case of France's Opiration Turquoise in Rwanda)96 or
may call for cut-rate and irresolute methods that leave the situation worse
than it was before the intervention (as may have been true of the later
phases of the United States mission in Somalia and as may turn out to be
true in Afghanistan). Even if too little intervention is now objectively a
94. See Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism ": Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review ofthe NA TO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503 (2001) (criticizing
the targeting employed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign
against Yugoslavia).
96. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OuR FAMILIEs: STORIES FROM RWANDA 157-61 (1998).
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greater overall problem than too much intervention, it does not follow that
a broader licensing of intervention would occasion more of the right
measures in the right places.
Bounded pluralism thus serves to protect the poor and weak states from
the divergent interests, as well as from the overbearing values, of the rich
and strong states. It is, and is reasonably, an ordering principle of "the
deal" that the international system embodies. The boundaries of the
international order's pluralism nonetheless remain variable, and relative
convergences in both values and interests over time have led to the
broadening of exceptions to sovereign prerogative, such as jus cogens,
universal jurisdiction, and humanitarian intervention.97
Why should an overwhelmingly strong power, confident in its
righteousness, be concerned to keep faith with this "deal"? Why should it
respect the sovereign prerogatives of states that hold no moral high ground
and that can be effectively manhandled? The question is all the more
pressing when the strong power finds itself faced not merely with obstacles
to its interests and affronts to its values, but with dire security threats from
nonstate actors, heedless of all legal order, whom other states may brazenly
refuse to acknowledge as common enemies.
A legal order endures only if it reconciles the long-term policy interests
of its participants, strong and weak. Since the strong often have the option
to proceed by extortion or direct action rather than by accommodation,
whereas the weak are willing to concede much in return for the guaranteed
security of what little is left to them, the strong have disproportionate
bargaining power in setting the legal rules. At the same time, the strong
have reason to prefer orderly processes and clear baselines to the chaos and
costliness of ad hoc exertions, and whatever their strength, the strong have
much to fear from the desperate and the humiliated among the weak. The
strong should thus resist the temptation, once they have negotiated a legal
order that provides avenues by which most of their goals can be achieved,
to have their cake and eat it too-to insist that the terms of the deal are
binding on the weak, but reserve to themselves (and by extension, to all
others with the power to get away with it) the prerogative to do as they see
97. I have devoted this commentary to explaining what kinds of lines need to be drawn,
without articulating positions on precisely where the lines should be drawn. The latter I have done
extensively elsewhere. See Brad R. Roth, Anti-Sovereigntism, Liberal Messianism, and Excesses
in the Drive Against Impunity, 12 FINNISHY.B. INT'L L. 17 (2003); Brad R. Roth, Bending the Law,
Breaking It, or Developing It? The United States and the Humanitarian Use of Force in the Post-
Cold War Era, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 232,
233 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003); Brad R. Roth, The Illegality of "Pro-Democratic"
Invasion Pacts, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 328,329 (Gregory H. Fox
& Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Brad R. Roth, Retrospective Justice or Retroactive Standards?:
Human Rights as a Sword in the East German Leaders Case, 50 WAYNE ST. L. REV. (forthcoming
Oct. 2004).
fit. And this is no less true where the strong perceive their cause to be
righteous.
In the long run, international peace cannot be predicated on the
privilege of the momentarily strong to pursue forcibly their unilateral
determinations of what is just in any given instance. Wagers on the
continued impotence of others are bad long-term bets.
V. PATRIOTISM AND THE DUTY TO UPHOLD A COMMUNITY'S
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
When Viet Dinh uses the term "nationalism,"'98 he is speaking of loyalty
to a political community whose membership encompasses the permanent
territorial population without distinction (putting aside thorny questions
about long-term resident aliens). Just as the international legal system
attributes "nationality" to individuals on the basis of connections to a
territorial state and predicates sovereign prerogatives on the equal rights of
each of the "peoples" that territorial states respectively represent, so too
does Dinh speak of a phenomenon rooted in established territorial
boundaries.
Today, "nationalism" most frequently refers to something very
different: an ethno-nationalism that problematizes the fit between state
boundaries and community membership, rooting duties of loyalty in a
common race, language, culture, or creed, and asserting privileges
accordingly. Even American nationalism, with which Dinh is principally
concerned, has not lacked its "nativist" moments. Yet Dinh clearly uses the
term not to flirt with ethno-nationalist conceptions, but instead to
emphasize that his is an unabashedly robust form of what is more routinely
known as "patriotism."
Patriotism, like sovereignty, is open to an array of conflicting
interpretations. A typical finesse in confronting the concept is to present
two polar versions: the first so sharply provocative as to be patently
unreasonable, and the second so harmonized with liberal-universalist
political morality as to be denuded of any normative significance. In fact,
many commonplace invocations of patriotism are patently unreasonable in
that they assign little moral worth to foreigners (or to citizens who show
inordinate concern for foreigners)." At the same time, many orthodox
98. Dinh, supra note 1.
99. Some such invocations can be seen in the current "war on terrorism" rhetoric. The
September 1I attacks inevitably remind us of our common identity and destiny as a people. The
victims, after all, were targeted solely for inhabiting buildings that the attackers identified as
symbols of America. Yet in our shared outrage, Americans seem divided between those who regard
the attacks as an affront primarily to the humanity of the victims (to whom we feel a special bond
as Americans) and those who regard the attacks as an affront primarily to the nation. Whereas the
former demand only to bring individual perpetrators to justice and to restore safety, and assess
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liberal universalists sincerely regard themselves, by virtue of being public-
spirited and having a deep emotional connection to their country's history
and symbols, as patriots. If, however, patriotism poses any distinctive
intellectual challenges, these must emanate from a conception that falls
into neither of these categories.
Universalism does not preclude an ethical division of labor. Efficacy
considerations alone dictate that individuals concentrate the bulk of their
affirmative efforts to enrich the lives of others on those to whom they bear
special ties rather than diffusing them impartially across humanity as a
whole. Beyond that, efficacious social action requires collectivities that are
empowered to decide on and to coordinate social projects; for "us" to take
action, there must first be an "us" to whom the decisions pertain and who
bear special responsibility for following through on those decisions,
irrespective of individual opinions and preferences, because those
decisions have been validly taken in the name of the collectivity.
Moreover, universalist political morality posits goals that presuppose a
determinate scope of application; boundaries are inherent in the effort to
secure for all the opportunity to live in a community that treats each
member with equal concern and that palpably belongs to all of its members
in equal measure. Because distinct communities have moral standing from
even a universalist perspective, universalists acknowledge that in the event
of irreconcilable conflict between communities, when "no just
accommodation of both sides' legitimate interests is
possible[,] ... universal morality would not require [liberals] to abandon
or betray their own communities."'
Insofar as patriotism poses a challenge to liberal-universalist political
morality, it does so by asserting that loyalty to a political community's
distinctive interests or distinctive values should override, at least to some
significant extent, universalist ethical imperatives.' ° ' Such a challenge
proposals for the use of force in light of those ends alone, the latter demand further to reassert a
national potency that the attacks, by their sheer audacity, are perceived to have called into question.
Attributing America's vulnerability to its having inspired insufficient fear (a somewhat doubtful
assessment of the sociology of suicidal fanaticism), this latter view assigns an independent value
to uses of force as demonstrations of might and resolve. Even beyond that, it finds redemption in
inflicting retribution on those perceived to have manifested disrespect for (even if they have not
actually attacked) the United States and in flouting restraints that it associates with a treacherous
or feckless solicitude for those manifesting such disrespect. (One is tempted to surmise that certain
individuals, forced to endure disrespect in their own lives, derive a vicarious sense of vindication
from identifying with an entity, in which they notionally participate, that displays the capacity to
extract expressions of respect from the recalcitrant.) This view may qualify as "patriotism" of a sort,
but rejecting it can hardly be characterized as "unpatriotic."
100. Stephen Nathanson, In Defense of "Moderate Patriotism, "99 ETHICs 535, 541 (1989).
101. Compare id. at 535 (elaborating a patriotism consistent with universalist premises), with
Alasdair Maclntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, in THEORIZING CrrIZENSHIP 209 (Ronald Beiner ed.,
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must assert either (a) that the citizen is bound to side with her own
political community in conflicts with others, even (at least to some extent)
where it is objectively in the wrong or (b) that the citizen is bound to
further a particular conception of justice that reflects the political
community's distinctive character or traditions, even (at least to some
extent) where a conception of justice foreign to its character or traditions
is objectively superior.
The collective moral right to self-determination, as elaborated and
defended above, does not entail a general acceptance of either of these
assertions (nor does it necessarily reject them). It does suggest, however,
that where foreign exertions jeopardize a political community's capacity
to defend its interests or to arrive at decisions in keeping with the
distinctive values of its members, the imperative to maintain that
capacity-inasmuch as this is itself a matter of objective moral
right-justifies coming to the defense of that community's sovereign
prerogatives, even where those prerogatives have been exercised unjustly.
This conclusion is predicated not on a rejection of universalist morality,
but on a paradox that arises within universalist morality. It is in the nature
of moral rights to demarcate an inviolable space (however limited) within
which the right-bearer, whether individual or collective, is free to exercise
discretion, even if immorally. °2 "Our country... right or wrong," is, in
this very limited application, consistent with objective right.' °3
Thus, there may be a patriotic duty to help prevent foreign political
communities from improperly dictating to or intervening within one's own
community, even where there is a simultaneous duty to work for an
internal remedy to the injustice of which the foreigners complain.'0 4
Similarly, an oppositionist, even ifjustified in working to install a foreign-
inspired system of public order (on the ground that it is morally superior
to anything rooted in local traditions), may have a patriotic duty not to
1995) (elaborating a patriotism sharply at odds with universalism).
102. See JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 63-64 (1993).
103. Dinh, supra note 1, at 877 (quoting Commodore Stephen Decatur, Toast at a Dinner in
Norfolk, Virginia (Apr. 1816), in ALEXANDER SLIDELL MACKENZIE, LIFE OF STEPHEN DECATUR
295, 295 (1848)).
104. While the United States does not often find its sovereignty genuinely threatened, United
States reservations to human rights treaties provide a fittingly mundane illustration. American
international lawyers routinely advocate the withdrawal of these reservations on the ground that
they license unjust practices. Those same lawyers may nonetheless object to foreign efforts to treat
the reservations as nullities (on the strained theory that the reservations are not only inconsistent
with the treaties' object and purpose, but also severable from the rest of the ratified instrument). The
United States cannot properly be held accountable to obligations, however righteous, from which
it has expressly withheld its consent. There is no inconsistency in insisting on respect for treaty
reservations that one deems to be unjust. While patriotism has nothing to do with the merits of the
point, it does, perhaps, place a special (if relatively trivial) onus on United States lawyers to stand
up for the point in international fora.
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accept inappropriate kinds or degrees of foreign assistance for these efforts.
Once again, however, these duties are only presumptive; where state
misconduct is so extreme as to defeat the purposes for which the
community's political independence is duly valued, the duties are vitiated.
(Of course, it does not follow that even such gross misconduct will suffice
to eradicate perceptions of patriotic duty.)
This take on patriotism, like the collective right to self-determination
from which it derives, is a matter of peculiar significance to poor and weak
states. It speaks to reasons that even tyrannized inhabitants of such states
have to resist foreign-initiated projects of "regime change." Whatever
moral justification there may be for supporting one's own state's violations
of other states' territorial integrity and political independence will have to
be sought elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
Viet Dinh's reassertion of the significance of sovereignty and patriotism
in the post-September 11 era is provocative and apt, but it is only a start in
confronting the multitude of complex and contentious questions associated
with these concepts. His reminder of the more benign aspects of the much-
reviled Decatur toast, "Our country... right or wrong," might prompt us
to ask, for example, on what terms we are to relate to others who also bear
commitments, both to their countries and to conceptions of right and
wrong that we may not share.
Notwithstanding international law's dramatic expansion into areas once
considered matters of exclusive domesticjurisdiction, respect for sovereign
prerogative continues to be a central feature of the international legal
system, limiting both the establishment of binding obligations and the
means by which established obligations can be enforced. The inviolability
of self-governing political communities stands as a foundational principle
of international order. This principle appears inconvenient when the
decisions that emerge from these communities seem to be, and perhaps
objectively are, unjust ones. Nonetheless, fundamental disagreements
about justice are an enduring feature of the human condition, and they
necessitate a pluralistic solution. In certain respects and within certain
limits, collectivities must be said to have a right to be wrong about justice,
and outsiders must be called on to respect collective enterprises of which
they are not a part. Moreover, a broad license for powerful states to impose
solutions on less powerful ones in the name of universal justice is not an
especially promising alternative.
Although exceptions to respect for sovereign prerogative have properly
prevailed in many instances, the exceptions should not be permitted to
swallow the rule. A respectful and orderly relationship among bearers of
conflicting conceptions ofjust public order provides the only firm basis for
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international peace and cooperation. It also provides the basis upon which
human beings-situated, as they are, in political communities-have the
best chance to accomplish their ends.
